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Takeshi Inagami*  
The Death of the „Labour Movement“ and the „Japanization“ 
of Industrial Relations 
The ending of the Cold War gave birth to new debates, new ideas – even an 
atheoretical theory that the „End of History“ had arrived. But more important was the 
bigger question: so what kind of capitalism had won? The urgency of the question 
was enhanced by the fact that, through the 1980s both the Neo-American-type 
political economy, and its main contender, the neo-corporatist type, had run up 
against numerous difficulties1 and shown their inherent limitations. The 1980s were a 
bad time for all national „models“ of the political economy. It is not surprising that 
academic attention turned increasingly to the two countries whose macro-economic 
performance seemed relatively superior – Germany and Japan. 
But there are, of course, important differences between the two countries, even if 
both are classified as similar exemplars of „Rhine-type capitalism“. Dore's attempt to 
characterize those differences and at the same time to foresee the future pattern of 
German industrial relations has much in common with the convergence thesis 
developed in his classic British Factory: Japanese Factory. Its provocative 
suggestion is: (1) that in the long run German industrial relations, like those of many 
other European nations, will undergo a process of devolution to the enterprise level, 
and (2), in the course of such devolution something comparable to the Japanese firm-
as-community will be created. In short, one can describe Dore's argument as – to use 
the word Streeck once used (1984b) – as the Japanization hypothesis. And (3), this 
process implies the death of any „Labour Movement“ based on class consciousness 
and aiming to transform society, leaving only a system of worker representation such 
as exists in the United States and Japan. 
                                                          
*  Prof. Dr. Takeshi Inagami, Graduate School of Humanities and Sociology, The University of 
Tokyo. Author of Sociology of Industrial Relations; Contemporary Labour in Britain; 
International Coparison of Neo-Corporatism and many others works. 
1 America's internal economic difficulties led to sustained pressure on Japan (demands for 
expansion of internal demand, deregulation, market-opening, acceptance of a high yen exchange 
rate, the „Japan is a deviant from world norms“ argument, etc.) which secured some political 
advantages without, however, curing the internal problems. 
 The theoretical implications of the „collapse of the Swedish model“ are also considerable. In the 
first place it was a model for the political economy of a single industrial country designed for its 
manual workers. As such it was bound in time to be subject to amendment or „collapse“. 
Secondly, one cannot understand the workings of that process of amendment without taking 
account of internal conflict on the union side, conflict which was essentially class conflict 
between the LO representing the working class and the TCO representing the new middle class. 
The very craft/occupational structure of the unions – if compared with other countries' industrial 
or enterprise union structure – had all the traditional hallmarks of a class-conscious „labour 
movement“. 
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Certainly, as Dore suggests, Japan's class-conscious labour movement is dead. I 
would say that it reached the stage of brain-death with the defeat of the union in the 
Miike strike of 1960 – the year that saw the publication of Kerr and his associates' 
Industrialism and industrial man, the „embodiment of the cold war in social theory“. 
Final heart failure came with the break-up and privatization of the national railways 
in 1985. 
I would like to concentrate in this comment on two points: how does one 
characterize the Japanese model of industrial relations? And is Germany moving 
towards it? 
I.  Japanese Style Industrial Relations 
Enterprise-based cooperative industrial relations 
Japanese industrial relations are based on a cooperative relationship between the 
individual union and the individual management of separate enterprises. There is no 
legally-based system of co-determination as in Germany,2 nor is there the dual system 
of collective bargaining external to the firm and works council consultation within it. 
The distinction between collective bargaining and consultation is ambiguous, and in 
practice it is fair to say that the consultation element dominates. As for wage 
bargaining, although there is a complex process of creating something like a social 
consensus at the national level with a pattern setting role being played by the metal 
industries (steel, automobiles, electrical, shipping and heavy machinery) and 
transmission mechanisms affecting the public sector and the small firms, (see Dore et 
al. 1989, Soskice, 1990 and Sako, forthcoming), actual wage bargaining takes place 
within individual firms. 
But why cooperative enterprise unions? In fact, why enterprise unions at all? 
Unions, like other organizations, require some community of interest, or of ideals, 
among their members – which in this case are, typically, the regular full-time 
employees of the firm, i.e., excluding retired pensioners, temporary and part-time 
workers, and managers who are defined by the current Trade Union Law as 
„representatives of the interests of the employer“. What interests do these regular 
full-time workers have in common? 
Dore points to three factors which help to give them a sense of membership in 
their company rather than in some occupational group cross-cutting company 
boundaries. First, the wage system is not based on occupational qualifications or job 
functions, but on the one hand on personal characteristics such as educational level 
and on the other on seniority and merit as assessed by personnel appraisal systems. 
Secondly and relatedly, occupational labour markets are undeveloped, and 
                                                          
2 However, unions are quite deeply involved in management issues. In a recent survey 60 percent 
of unions spoke of informal contacts between managers and union leaders, disclosure to union 
leaders of confidential information, and opportunities to comment effectively on company 
strategy. 
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compensated for by well-developed on-the-job training systems. And thirdly, average 
tenures are long, and promotion tracks lead deeply into management. It is clear that 
this contrasts with the situation of the German worker whose „unit of common 
interest“, spreads across the boundaries of individual firms, thanks to the wage 
determination system and the skill-training system. If only within certain given limits 
– e.g., the metal industries of Nordwürttemberg/Nordbaden – people of the same 
category (blue-collar, white-collar, technicians, Meister) and of the same wage or 
salary group have their pay determined by the same set of negotiations, irrespective 
of the firm for which they work. Very different from the Japanese internal wage 
system, which is non-transparent to the outside and has many firm-specific 
characteristics. 
Other factors reinforce this confinement of the (usually male) regular workers' 
„unit of common interest“ within the firm, and not just their long average job tenures 
(as the OECD Employment Outlook 1993 showed, there is not, in that respect, much 
difference between Japan and Germany, or even France). Such are: the promotion 
system which can lead up into the higher ranks of management (Tsusansho, 1995); 
the persistence of a community consciousness in the firm which, for instance, inhibits 
a Toyota employee from ever taking a job with Nissan, or a Hitachi employee from 
ever moving to Toshiba3; the firm-specific nature of the wage-determination system; 
the persistence, even now, of a personnel management ideology which sees the 
manager's job as „guaranteeing the livelihoods of the employees“;4 and the fact that 
the Japanese corporate governance system serves greatly to restrict the controlling 
voice of shareholders (see Dore 1989, 1992, Charkham 1994, Prowse 1995). It is this 
complex of factors which makes it plausible for the regular employees of a firm to 
perceive themselves as having a common interest with the firm in which they work, 
and with its management – that, in other words, they constitute an enterprise 
community. 
Which means that the question of how far German industrial relations have 
become „Japanized“ resolves itself into the question of how far the characteristics 
listed above – or functionally equivalent characteristics – have come to characterize 
German industrial relations, or, to put it in another way, how far changing conditions 
have made the German worker's „unit of common interest“ coincide with the 
individual firm. 
 
The limits of enterprise-based industrial relations 
                                                          
3 This applies across the board, from manual workers to managers. Attempts to explain this in 
terms of non-transferrable firm-specific skills find no support in opinion surveys. It seems rather 
to be an expression of personal distrust – shown by both workers and recruiters – for members 
of alien „rival communities“. 
4 The characterization, based on a long series of empirical studies of Matsushima (1962). It has 
much in common with what Dore (1973) called „welfare corporatism“. 
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This picture of Japanese industrial relations needs qualification however, in that 
the coming of the first oil shock required cooperative enterprise-based relations to be 
supplemented by the participation of unions in policy-making. 
Wage-bargaining was the central issue. Until the oil crisis, unions could 
basically just make demands for „large wage increases“ and not concern themselves 
with the effect such increases might have on the national economy. Afterwards, the 
unions – particularly those belonging to the IMF-JC federation (International 
Metalworkers Federation: Japan Commmittee) which were exposed to international 
competition became much more concerned about the effect of inflation on real wages, 
and the effect of wage increases on inflation. One might summarise the change in 
thinking of influential union leaders as follows: (1) unions could no longer simply 
concentrate on getting nominal wage increases; (2) compatibility with the needs of 
the national economy meant that wage demands had to take account of the 
international competitive position of the exporting metal industries, and this meant 
that those industries had to be the wage increase pattern-setters (clearly echoing the 
Swedish EFO or the social concerns which enter into German wage bargaining); (3) 
the concentration on real wages required the unions to be in a position to exert 
effective influence over government policies not only on price controls, but also on 
taxation and social security; (4) and this meant that unions needed to create an 
organization that could speak on policy issues with a unified voice: the need to make 
effective representations to the bureaucracy and to the political parties responsible for 
the formation and execution of policy was not matched by capacity, on the part of the 
major private sector unions. These reflections prompted moves on the one hand to 
unify the national centre organizations, and on the other to create – in the Labour 
Union Policy Roundtable, formed in 1976 – a body which would have the specialist 
function of making the unions' voice heard in government policy making. 
Relating this to Dore's analysis, one could describe the formation of this body as 
an attempt by the IMF-JC and the Domei federation (of predominantly private sector 
unions) to erode the strength of the old „Labour Movement“ forces – the Sohyo 
federation dominated by the public sector unions (Local Government, Teachers, 
Railways, Posts and Telecommunications) together with the Socialist Party – and to 
build instead a new, institutionalised, policy-participation network that would link the 
unions to the government bureaucracy, to employers organizations, and to all the 
political parties except the Communists. This conflict between the old and the new 
forces among the unions finally resulted in the collapse of the old and the established 
hegemony of the new – the landmark events being the the 1985 break-up and 
privatization of the railways and the evolution of the Policy roundtable into Rengo, 
the new national trade union centre in 1989. 
Important points to note about this emergent concern with participation in policy 
making: first, that it not only marked the beginning of a loose kind of corporatism, 
but also showed the limitations of enterprise-based industrial relations; secondly, that 
the recognition of the need to supplement cooperative enterprise-based relations with 
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involvement in national policy-making resulted in a kind of centralization5 of labour 
union activity, and thirdly, in marked contrast to the tendency in Europe in the 1970s 
for the participation frontier to move from outside to inside the firm, in Japan it was 
the reverse. From which one might just possibly derive the prediction that, instead of 
the Japanization of German industrial relations as Dore suggests, the two countries 
might converge on some unknown intermediate point. 
A loose administrative corporatism 
A comprehensive view of Japanese industrial relations has to take account of 
this development and institutionalization of policy participation. „Corporatism 
without labour“ (Pempel and Tsunekawa 1979, Wilensky and Turner 1987) is no 
longer an accurate description. 
I call the Japanese system a „loose administrative corporatism“ (Inagami 1991, 
1992). Katzenstein (1980) used the term „loose neo-corporatism“ to describe Western 
Germany and Streeck (1984b) used a similar formulation. In Japan's case the 
„looseness“ consists in (1) the fact that it is founded in a decentralized micro-
corporatism; (2) the fact that the leading private sector unions which have pushed for 
policy participation have shown considerable tolerance of neo-liberal programmes – 
they were in favour of the break-up and privatization of the railways, for example, 
and have shown a basically cooperative attitude on deregulation and market-
opening.6 As for the „administrative“, I refer to the fact that, in contrast to Sweden or 
Austria or Germany, it is the bureaucracy not the social partners themselves which 
plays the leading role. 
As to the effectiveness of the unions' participation in policy-making opinions 
differ.7 Rengo's policy demands have rarely been completely at odds with the 
dominant view in the relevant bureaucracies or employers' associations. There have 
been examples of proposals originating from Rengo which have been pursued 
through various deliberative committees and through formal and informal contact 
with bureaucrats and eventually issued in legislation. At the very least, there have 
been cases – the revision of the Labour Standards Law, the establishment of a Law 
Governing Parenting Leave, and tax reform, for example – in which the views 
expressed by Rengo have played an important role. (Ohmi 1994) 
                                                          
5 If one looks at the post-war period as a whole, one might say that the maturing of the 
cooperative enterprise-based IR system represented a decline of the „shop-floor community“ 
which was consonant with a class-based „labour movement“, in favour of the development of 
the „enterprise community“ – also a kind of centralization. (See Inagami, 1981) 
6 See, for example, the joint declaration of the IMF-JC and the Nikkeiren employers' federation, 
Ten joint proposals for dealing with the overvalued yen and the hollowing out of industry 
(September 1995), or On deregulation in the 12 Jan 1996 issue of Rengo's policy magazine, 
Rengo, (No.91). 
7 Dore has offered a quite scathing assessment of their effectiveness. (Dore 1990) 
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The whole picture of Japanese industrial relations must, then, include, not only 
the cooperative enterprise-based system, but also the industry-wide level, and the 
national policy-making level with which Rengo concerns itself – the whole three-
level structure. Japanese neo-corporatism does have its own problems8 but 
presumably when Dore speaks of German industrial relations becoming Japanized he 
is not referring to the whole „loose administrative corporatist“ structure, but only the 
enterprise-level pattern which is at its base. 
What kind of enterprise community? 
A further question is how far the typical Japanese „enterprise community“ is 
itself undergoing qualitative change. The first part of the 1990s, thanks to the 
prolonged recession, saw a flood of superficial arguments to the effect that the 
lifetime employment system had „collapsed“. But, as Dore himself has observed 
(1996), the reality is rather different from what certain managers and neo-classical 
economists would like it to be. To be sure, support for change in the Japanese 
employment system is greater now that it has ever been.9 The Nikkeiren employers' 
federation has proposed that firms should have a tripartite portfolio of employment 
arrangements including (in addition to regular employees and part-time, etc. 
temporaries) „deployers of high-level specialist skills“ who have mobile careers 
(Nikkeiren 1995). But in fact, if one is talking of male white collar workers in large 
firms – the major target of „employment adjustment“ measures during the recession – 
there has been something of a shift from „lifetime employment in the firm“ to 
„lifetime employment in the original firm or one of its subsidiaries or dependent 
suppliers“ and in that sense an enlargement of a quasi-internal labour market, but 
certinly not a breakdown of the long-term stable employment system. (Inagami 
1995). 
There have, however, been changes in the nenko system – the rules governing 
the role of seniority in promotion and pay. The Ministry of Labour did a sample 
survey of 4,063 workers in firms with more than a thousand employees in 1994. The 
46 percent who chose, „rethinking of the nenko promotion system“ as „what you 
would like to ask of the company's personnel systems and policies“ greatly 
outnumbered the nine percent who chose „preserve the system“. In a parallel survey 
of 515 personnel managers, the proportion who said that it was quite common in their 
firm for division chiefs to have older longer-service people under them was 38 
percent, and in the case of section chiefs 32 percent. Another question in the 
employee survey was: what do you think are „very important“ as characteristics of 
the ideal workplace. Only 2 percent said „age and seniority being given their due 
                                                          
8 Too many to go into here, e.g., clashes of interest between industry sectors, the declining sense 
of a „public interest“ in the manufacturing sector, the relation to new types of social movement, 
the ambiguities of Rengo policy and of its relations with political parties. 
9 See, for example, the Keizai Doyukai's Dai-juikkai Kigyo hakusho (Enterprise White Paper, 
No.11), 1994 
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weight“. Most votes went to: „being able to express one's opinions freely“(81%), 
„people cooperating to learn from and help each other“(70%), „having clear authority 
structures and division of job functions“(66%) and „having one's privacy 
respected“(55%). 
So there is – in the same survey half the male respondents said that it was 
reasonable to have to sacrifice a bit of one's personal life for the sake of the company 
and a third said that, yes, they supposed they could be described as „good company 
men“ – some sense that the old pattern of a relentlessly demanding company 
community ruled by age and seniority should give way to a freer and more open 
community of people who learn from and help each other (and thereby suppress 
tendencies towards naked cut-throat, interpersonal „market“ competition), and that 
there should therefore be not abolition but modification of the nenko system, and not 
abandonment but down-playing of nenko-type egalitarianism10. The background to 
this is a gradual diminution in the tendency to identify with the firm and the 
penetration of a „loose“ kind of individualism11. 
II. The Japanization of German Industrial Relations 
Enterprise-specific elements in human capital formation and wages 
Let us, drawing both on the foregoing and my own inquiries in Germany, list 
some of the factors which prompt Dore to suggest that German industrial relations 
may be moving in a Japanese direction. In the first place, average job tenures are not 
greatly different as between Germany and Japan. Secondly, employee representatives 
on the Aufsichsrat have a large influence on the choice of managers, but as to how 
much managers are promoted up from the ranks within the firm I know of no good 
data, but my impression is that it is rather less than in Japan. As for the personnel 
management ideology which privileges „guaranteeing the livelihoods of the 
employees“, it is a good deal less pronounced in Germany than in Japan. Corporate 
governance is, in Germany as in Japan, a matter very much under review, but even 
large firms frequently take the GmbH form and rely for their financing not on the 
stock exchange but on the intermediation of universal banks which exercise a 
dominant influence (OECD 1995). Hence, if one takes into account also the co-
determination system, it is very difficult to imagine that the stakeholder-model-type 
German firm will make the qualitative change into a neo-American type management 
                                                          
10 In the same survey as that quoted above respeondents were asked what they thought should 
ideally be the wage spread among people of the same age, same seniority and same educational 
qualification in the same firm. The answers averaged by age group were the same for all ages – 
from 30 percent above average to 20 percent below – an indication, probably, of what Whittaker 
(1990) has pointed to as the still robust egalitarian norms which characterize the Japanese 
system. 
11 One characteristic of this looseness is that the individualism is repressed, and as such it is not an 
individualism which threatens the end of collectivist industrial relations. (Cf. Bassett and Cave 
1993; Brown and Rea 1995) 
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system giving priority to the shareholders' interest. In short, Germany and Japan 
differ considerably in their structure and manner of corporate governance, but are 
similar in the sense that both are free of shareholder sovereignty. 
Dore places great emphasis on the other two of my earlier list of characteristics 
of the Japanese system – the firm-specific nature of human resource formation, and, 
linked with it, the firm-specific nature of wage systems. I cited the fact that a 
Japanese worker who moved from one firm to that firm's direct rival would be likely 
to lose personal credibility as an indicator of the strength of firm-as-community 
consciousness, and surely by that criterion – whether or not it has anything at all to do 
with the firm-specific nature of skills – Germany is a long way from Japan. However, 
Dore cites as evidence that skills are becoming more firm-specific, the fact that, in 
spite of the famous apprenticeship training system, the sense of identification with a 
craft and its skills is a good deal weaker than in Britain, the fact that the hitherto 
fragmentarily sub-divided crafts are being amalgamated into larger groups in the 
apprenticeship system, the fact that the skills and knowledge actually required are 
becoming more firm-specific, and the fact that apprenticeship in a high-prestige firm 
with the best facilities and trainers and curriculum carries with it the possibililty of a 
full-time job on completion of the apprenticeship, so that an apprenticeship becomes 
something like a probationary employment contract. A priori these are reasonable 
arguments; the question is: how far has such a process gone? The direction of change 
and the degree of change are separate questions, and it is the question of degree 
which I question. 
What it comes down to is: how far have German wage systems become 
genuinely firm-specific. Dore cites (1) factory-specific wage premia of up to 20 
percent; (2) the use of range rates which allow for individual variation in pay 
depending on performance evaluation – a shift from rate-for-the-job to rate-for-the-
person criteria, and a matter over which the works council has a good deal of 
influence, (3) the possibility of using this leeway to reward seniority, and (4) the 
spread of team-working. And he quotes as an illustration the standard career 
promotion trajectory of manual workers in a thousand-employee machine-tool maker 
near Stuttgart. This is the most interesting and persuasive part of Dore's analysis, and 
it calls to mind similar developments which have been recorded in Britain and 
Sweden. (Inagami 1990, Olsson 1990, Brown 1994) 
But the question is: how far has the process gone? Take the firm-specific wage 
premia which Dore says reach about 20 percent (a figure I also was given by 
Gesamtmetall). 1. Is there any secular tendency for that proportion to increase? and 2. 
Has there been any increase in the number of firms in which this, originally 
voluntary, supplement has become institutionalised? As for the first question, one 
knows that a number of large firms, needing to cut labour costs, reduced or 
eliminated this premium in the 1992-3 recession – Robert Bosch GmbH and 
Mercedes, for example. These premia, in other words, are not protected from the 
effects of the business cycle or the fortunes of particular firms. Moreover, there are 
considerable industry differentials. „In the metal and chemical industries they can 
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account for 25-30 percent on an individual's total wage packet, but in banking and 
commerce no more than 5-7 percent“ (IDS 1993: 12). And again, „within the metal 
industry itself, large firms may be paying 15-20 percent higher wages, but in, for 
example, ship-building which enjoys lesser international competitiveness, only 2-3 
percent“ (Shonfield 1993: 168). The DGB research institute reported that „wage drift 
has been stable for the last ten years“ (Inagami and Whittaker 1994). Williams claims 
that it was in the late 1960s that the wage drift was strongest and depending on the 
industry was as low as 3 and as high as 30 percent, but died down in the 1970s (1988: 
38). 
There seems, then, to be no tendency for these wage premia to increase over 
time, and, on the other point about institutionalization, we have no data proving any 
increase in that respect either, so one must conclude that only to a very limited degree 
can one talk about the Japanization of the wage system. To return to the question: 
„what is the unit of common interest?“ it remains true that 80 percent of an 
individual's wage is determined, according to his occupation and region, across the 
board and without reference to the firm in which he works. 
If this wage determination mechanism is to change it will be at the employers' 
initiative, and a response to the growing pressure of international competition and the 
imperative need to cut labour costs. If, for instance, large numbers of small and 
medium firms were to desert the employers' organizations, or if there were to be 
much greater use of opening clauses in enterprise level negotiations, then the 
possibility of much wider inter-firm differentials opening up, and the concomitant 
development of internalised firm-specific wage structures would be vastly increased. 
Strengthening international competitiveness and employment adjustment 
If one understands „Japanization“ narrowly to mean the development of 
decentralized cooperative industrial relations, there is one possible factor which 
might produce this result which Dore does not mention. That factor is the 
intensification of competition and the rethinking of labour practices which it may 
bring, together with the „hollowing out“ phenomenon (relocation of German 
manufacturing abroad) and employment adjustment. The sense of a serious crisis is 
there: witness the Federal Government's industrial location policies and the Land 
governments' efforts to strengthen the international competitiveness of the traditional 
automobile, electrical and chemical industries and to assist in the birth of new 
industrial sectors (see, for example Staatministerium Baden-Wurttemberg, Aufbruch 
aus dem Krise, 1993) or the more recent „Alliance for work“. With fears increasing 
that Germany's traditional non-mass-production high-quality manufacturing may be 
under threat (DIHT 1995: OECD 1995; Kern and Witte 1995: Audretsch 1995; The 
Economist March 18th 1995) the importance of firm-level discussions between 
managers and the work-force is bound to increase. For example, the development of 
out-sourcing, or the relocation of production to Eastern Europe will have implications 
for employment which the works councils of individual firms will have to face up to. 
Again, the introduction of new technology for the development of new levels of 
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quality and competitiveness, may require the revision of labour practices, and new 
forms of organization and training. IG Metall – which does not deny the need for 
cost-conscious management – may be effective in acting as consultant for works 
councils on these issues, but the actual discussions and decisions will have to be 
taken at the firm level. Framework agreements and general statements of policy are 
all very well, but they don't take one very far. The firm-level weighting in industrial 
relations is bound to increase. 
A somewhat different and more fundamental question which one might ask 
about restructuring for greater international competitiveness is: are works councils 
not likely to be seen by managers as a nuisance? Heinrich von Pierer of Siemens 
disclaims any such view (Financial Times, 16 Feb. 1996). But should it become the 
majority view in the future, and should it result in really radical change in the 
mechanisms of wage determination, then there would result a process of 
decentralization but through a very different scenario from the one which Dore 
depicts. 
But it is a scenario which potentially could bring Germany even closer to the 
realities of modern Japan – a Japan which has none of the extra-firm industry-wide 
wage bargaining mechanisms of Germany, where inter-firm wage differentials are 
much greater, and where there are no legal obligations to create co-determination 
mechanisms within the firm. But the Dore Japanization hypothesis is not that radical. 
The enterprise community as a community of common interest 
A final question: if the processes which Dore describes were to lead German 
industrial relations in a Japanese direction, is there a possibility of developing really 
Japanese-type enterprise communities? 
There is certainly not much diminution in the extent to which Japanese firms and 
their regular workers and those workers' unions are sharers of information and have a 
sense of common interest, though, as we have seen, even in Japan there is an 
irreversible trend, driven by the preferences of both managers and workers, towards 
making the enterprise community less all-demanding, more open, less dominated by a 
rigid nenko hierarchy. And this implies, in parallel, a – modest – diminution in the 
extent to which employees identify with their firm. 
So what, then, will they identify with? One answer is: not their company but 
their work. In the survey quoted earlier 80 percent of respondents said that they 
would „like to have a job in which one would be happy to work twice as hard as 
anybody else“. Another answer is: more close involvement with family and friends. 
In the same survey, 60 percent said that they had hobbies or were studying or 
otherwise socially active in contexts that had nothing to do with their work or their 
workmates, and 80 percent said that they agreed that „there is nothing interesting 
about a person who's only interested in his work“. 
In other words, one can hardly say that there has been much diminution in the 
work ethic in Japan (and consequently not much sign of what Bell called naked 
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hedonism), but the trend towards a lesser identification with the firm or its union, and 
the preference for a „privatist“ life-style separated from the workmate network is 
likely to grow and to be accelerated by the reduction in work hours. The all-
demanding enteprise community which dominates even the private lives of its 
employees is not going to be any longer acceptable. 
The process which Dore envisages is one in which the enterprise becomes more 
important as the „unit of common interest“ and, as a consequence, the extent to which 
employees identify with their firm increases. That is certainly a possibility, and taking 
account of the trends in Japan just described, that could mean that the gap between 
the nature of the „enterprise community“ in Germany and Japan (if community is still 
the right word) would be narrowed – but from both directions. 
Conclusion 
I have been trying to add two suggestions to Dore's perspective on the future of 
German industrialization. 
The first is that there might be a process of loose convergence between Japan 
and Germany towards an as yet unknowable third position. This means, on the 
German side, an even greater development of enterprise-decentralized cooperative 
industrial relations – the part of the Dore view which I accept. Though I foresee limits 
to the process to which Dore ascribes this result – namely the increasing 
concentration within the enterprise of both wage-determination and training. (One has 
to take account both of the difficulty of changing traditionally well-established 
systems and the flexibility of those systems themselves.) In short, I would expect the 
wage-bargaining system and the dual system of training to be retained even if their 
importance in the whole picture diminishes. On the Japanese side, the central 
institutions of the cooperative enterprise industrial relations system remain intact but 
their functional limits have required supplementation at the industry level and, for 
policy participation purposes, at the national level. What I called the „loose 
administrative corporatism“ system will probably be forced to change, but is unlikely 
to disappear altogether. Central to this convergence notion is the idea of a slowly 
diminishing difference between Germany and Japan in the extent to which the 
enterprise community is the „unit of common interest“. Note that this point of 
convergence is not an American-type system of total retreat from collective industrial 
relations towards decentralization and individualization. 
The second point is to suggest a scenario of even more radical Japanization of 
German industrial relations. This envisages the possibility, for instance, of a 
breakdown in employer solidarity with mass defections of the Mittelstand from 
employer organisations, of the reduction of the coverage of wage contracts to firms 
with union organization (cf. OECD 1994); of the growth of enterprise-level 
bargaining much beyond that which the opening clauses now make possible (which 
would require a change in the law); or of a loosening of the laws governing 
workplace industrial relations to increase the range of unilateral managerial 
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discretion. Such developments would involve radical changes in the wage 
determination and training systems, and involve unprecedented legal changes. They 
would amount to an end to co-determination as we understand it, and to the German-
model of political economy. Whether that is likely to happen or not depends, 
essentially, on one thing – whether German manufacturing industry manages to 
maintain and improve its international competitiveness within the framework which 
co-determination and the dual system of training create. 
At the moment I consider this latter scenario rather less likely than the 
convergence scenario. So how do I then differ from the Dore hypothesis? In two 
respects: first, in seeing narrower limits to the sort of evolution which Dore suggests 
will make German more like Japanese industrial relations. And secondly, in 
suggesting that, if one looks at the evolution of Japanese industrial relations over the 
last quarter of this century as a whole, it is less reasonable to think that one industrial 
relations system will become more like the other, than to imagine both in movement 
and slowly converging towards a common point. 
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